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This article examines the potential conflict of interest of underwriters in London’s foreign sovereign debt
markets prior to the Baring crisis of . We describe the main sources of information for investors con-
cerning Argentina, whose government debt default contributed to Baring’s collapse, and compare them
with those of the underwriters, particularly Baring’s. We then present some empirical evidence using
data on bond prices and underwriting fees that demonstrate that Baring did not exploit its information
lead to the detriment of investors. Finally, we present historical evidence that shows that Baring foresaw
default before markets did and consequently planned a bailout loan that could not be issued due to
political instability in Buenos Aires.
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It’s like, if you have something good to say, you say it, but if you have something bad to say,
just keep your mouth shut.
– Federico Thomsen, Chief economist, ING Baring’s office in Buenos Aires, 
You will readily understand that in view of the aspect of affairs in the Argentine Republic, at
present or for some time past, we have received numerous enquiries from our investing clients
with respect to the government, city and provincial loans of that country held by them…We
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comments they offered on previous versions: Marc Flandreau, Stefano Battilossi, Michael Bordo,
Gerardo Della Paolera, Pablo Martin Aceña, Sebastian Nieto, Jérôme Sgard, and participants at the
EHESS meeting in Istanbul , the LACEA Meeting in Mexico , the OFCE Seminar of
Economic History in April , the APHE Meeting in Lisbon in November , the First Euro-
Clio Conference and Fast-Track Initiative ‘Exchanges in economic history’ in Paris , and the
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anonymous referees were most useful. I would also like to thank the archivists at ING Baring,
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should be much obliged if you would favour us with any information in your power as to the
present financial situation.
– Letter from Foster & Braithwaite, broker at the London
Stock Exchange, to Baring Brothers, 
I
On  November , financial markets woke up to the news that one of the most
respected merchant banks in the world, Baring Brothers, had overexposed itself by
keeping a large amount of unsold and illiquid Argentine securities. It was only able
to continue operations thanks to an international bailout orchestrated by the Bank
of England, which injected a large amount of liquidity in order to prevent a
banking panic that could have triggered an earthquake at the very centre of the inter-
national financial system, the City of London.
The Baring crisis of  has been one of the major events in the history of inter-
national finance. It had international spillovers, as it occurred during one of the major
periods of financial globalisation, also considered to be the first bond era of capital
markets. This episode has been studied from a number of different perspectives, and
now, after more than  years, it emerges once more as a reflection of the current
crisis. Parallels can be drawn for a number of issues: it followed a major boom in inter-
national finance; financial intermediaries played a central role in originating and distri-
buting a number of new securities into the markets including mortgage-backed
‘cedulas’; even though Lombard Street did sound the alarm and despite the associated
macroeconomic risks, investors continued to pour capital into Argentina, the country
in which the international crisis originated. Finally, the British authorities had to deal
with Baring’s near collapse. Baring Brothers was one of the most influential merchant
investment banks in London and played an important part in the lending boom. As in
most cases, this boom ended with a financial crash that caused sharp falls in inter-
national trade, foreign investment and economic growth.
One main difference with our current financial architecture is the array of services
that banks such as Baring offered to their clients. In a world of strong information
asymmetries and in the absence of rating agencies and international organisations,
those banks were in charge of monitoring, pricing, securities issuing and other
related activities. Therefore, they constituted important information producers; for
this purpose they sent permanent representatives all over the world and even devel-
oped their own communication systems.2
In addition, they were the first agents governments contacted when they sought
funds in London. Though this dominant position in a financial sector offers a
natural environment for scale economies, this also creates scope for conflicts of inter-
est, and the Baring crisis may have been a consequence of this problem. This article
2 Case studies are described in Flandreau () for Crédit Lyonnais and Liedtke () for Rothschild.
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analyses this episode from amicroeconomic perspective, and attempts to contribute to
the literature on nineteenth-century financial markets’ microeconomic structure.
Finally, this article aims to improve the understanding of the Baring crisis. Previous
studies have mainly dealt with macroeconomic issues and have left aside a number
of important aspects related to investors’ continuous enthusiasm towards Argentina
despite the warning signals. We focus therefore on the information level of investors
and the behaviour of financial intermediaries. On the one hand, we describe, in detail,
investors’ sources of information and what they published about Argentina. On the
other, we analyse whether financial intermediaries properly monitored borrowing
countries or whether some malfunction occurred during the lending boom. We
look at whether financial intermediaries acted as ‘banksters’, hiding information on
the solvency of Argentina in order to place additional securities and earn underwriting
commissions, and whether this caused Argentina’s over-indebtedness and led to its
eventual default.3 Was the Baring crisis a consequence of a strong conflict of interest
faced by underwriters of Argentine securities; conflict which led to investors’mistrust
and the consequent sudden-stop of British capital exports to the rest of the world?
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we review the literature on the Baring
crisis and on the economics of conflicts of interest in investment banking. In Section
III, we demonstrate that there existed important information asymmetries among the
leading underwriter, Baring, the other banks and investors. We find that investors
could be aware of the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions in Argentina, but
that for some reason this was not reflected in the prices of Argentinian securities.
Moreover, we establish that Baring’s main information advantage was the production
of ‘soft information’ through its long-term relationship with Argentina and from
direct communication with the government. In Section IV, we test the consequences
of this information structure, and look for possible evidence of conflicts of interest and
try to determine whether the most reputable banks played a certification role. Section
V concludes.
I I
Argentina became the favourite destination of European investors’ capital during the
s. Economic growth had been impressive there since the previous crisis of 
(Cortés Conde ; Della Paolera ; Cerro ), thereby attracting an increasing
number of European immigrants. Exports were booming; agricultural profitability
increased as a result of the discovery and conquest of new land, which in turn led
to urban development and the construction of railways. Although Argentina had a
bad debt service record similar to that of most other Latin American countries, it suc-
cessfully managed to survive the s world crisis and thus to disassociate itself from
the rest of the region by becoming one of the few Latin American countries to avoid
3 See recent paper on the role of financial intermediaries as possible ‘banksters’ in the s by Flandreau,
Gaillard and Panizza ().
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default. It also achieved a stable macroeconomic environment by controlling public
expenditures, by channelling external funds to finance the construction of new infra-
structure and by adopting the gold standard in .
On the whole, however, this apparently prosperous economy was not as healthy as
it seemed. Fiscal imbalances caused a short-term crisis in  (causing fluctuations in
the paper peso exchange rates, and prompting the country to abandon the gold stan-
dard), which marked the beginning of the debacle. The second half of the decadewas,
in fact, characterised by a deteriorating macroeconomic and financial situation – as
shown, for instance, by Ford (), Cortés Conde (), Della Paolera ()
and Della Paolera and Taylor (). Some of the main indicators are presented in
Table , in which the fiscal and monetary variables clearly show a deteriorating
trend. Deficits grew and were financed through borrowing, at first, and later
through monetary issues, which increased due to the free banking law introduced
in . This led to a sharp depreciation of the peso after , creating a potential
liquidity imbalance because most of Argentina’s public debt was denominated in
hard currency. In order to avoid debt servicing difficulties, the government intro-
duced a  per cent export duty in , increased its extraordinary revenues by
selling state assets between  and , and decided to negotiate a new loan
from London to support the short-term needs of the treasury.
This situation did not deter foreign investors from continuing to bet on Argentina’s
economic miracle. Capital continued to flow into Argentina more than into any other
Latin American country and reached a peak in , two years before the crisis (Stone
). Moreover, portfolio investment did not cease until political unrest and econ-
omic distress, including partial default in the first half of , became known to all.
There is no consensus in Argentina’s abundant historiography about whether
Argentina’s macroeconomic policy was inappropriate and whether its debt levels
were sustainable in the long run. Ford (), for instance, argues that the Baring
Table . Argentina’s macroeconomic indicators
Years Real
GDP
growth
(%)
Paper peso
depreciation
(%)
Inflation
(%)
Deficit to
ordinary
public
revenue
Debt service
to ordinary
public
revenue
Percentage of
debt service
paid in gold
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . -. -. . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 -. . . . NA NA
Sources: Della Paolera (), Flores ().
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crisis was a ‘crisis of development’, as Argentina had to meet short-term debt service
obligations, while the positive effects of investment projects on exports were long-
term rather than short-term effects. He suggests that flows of capital in the s
were positive and necessary for the economic growth of the country. In a similar
vein, Duncan () argues that although the government was perfectly aware that
it could not avoid short-term default, it continued to borrow as part of a long-
term development strategy. According to Duncan, the main victims of this strategy
were investors.
Whether or not investors were aware that this situation would lead to a debt default
is a different question. On the one hand, Wirth () argues that by  investors
already suspected that Argentina was over-borrowing. Joslin () notes that in ,
the only reason the director of the London & River Plate Bank had to explain why
funds continued to flow into the country was that the interest rates prevailing in
England were low. Eichengreen () argues that the Baring crisis was expected.
These authors agree with contemporary views. The general mood in the financial
press, as we show below, was pessimistic. On the other hand, Argentina’s long-
term sovereign debt spreads over British consoles remained surprisingly stable
during the years prior to the crisis – and only increased in the second half of .
Moreover, the last national government bonds issued in  and  continued
to have long maturities –  and  respectively – suggesting that debt sustain-
ability was taken for granted. These facts suggest three possibilities: first of all, investors
did not expect a crisis, continued to believe in the Argentine miracle and underesti-
mated the risk. This seems implausible given the amount of negative information in
the press and in different economic publications (see next section). Secondly, there
might also have existed a moral hazard problem, whereby investors were aware of
the risk involved but continued buying Argentinian bonds because they expected
Baring to act as Argentina’s last resort lender, as it had done in previous defaults.4
This also seems implausible, as the failure of issuers to place new securities on the
markets was common in the late s; in fact, these failures were at the origin of
Baring’s liquidity problems. Thirdly, secondary market spreads did not only reflect
investors’ expectations about an incoming crisis. Evidence from the press, banks’
archives and historians’ works shows, for instance, that banks supported prices so
that the market would remain stable and they could continue introducing additional
issues.5 Moreover, the effect of banks’ identity, their reputation and expected
4 Baring actively participated in the negotiation with defaulting countries and even took part in some
meetings of bondholder associations and the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. See, for instance,
Costeloe (), Ferns () and Flandreau and Flores ().
5 The press occasionally published articles on the banks’ involvement in sustaining prices in order to
create the necessary conditions to issue new loans. See, for instance, The Economist, published on 
October : ‘For a long time past the unsound condition of the market for foreign securities has
been notorious and before now prices would have certainly collapsed, had it not been for the
support of the big financiers, who have done much to bolster up the market, because a downright
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behaviour (such as a potential conflict of interest) must be taken into account in the
analysis of sovereign risk.
Financial intermediaries provided an array of services to countries looking for external
funding in European financial markets, and were paid fees for each service, including an
underwriting fee that dependedon the risk involved and thedistribution andmarket pla-
cement used.6 But they also played the role of rating agencies and could advise investors
about the best investment opportunities (Flandreau ). They were considered as a
source of information to ordinary investors or as a press agency, as specific relationships
developed with borrowing governments, and so financial intermediaries had the possi-
bility of communicating information that could be relevant to investors. This created
scope for a conflict of interest, which could only be resolved through the market mech-
anism as this was a repeated game and reputation mattered. Flandreau and Flores ()
capture this fact in the extreme case of the s, where the most reputable banks
(measured as those with the highest capitalisation and market shares) were also those
whose issues defaulted least. In their model, a highly reputable bank had no reason to
exploit its informational advantage, as any bad choice would impact on its reputation
and consequently on its market power. On the other hand, financial intermediaries
with a low market share and no reputation to defend are prone to exploit their infor-
mation advantage (selling bad securities as if they were good).
Nevertheless, market discipline alone cannot prevent conflicts of interest even
among prestigious banks. We have reasons to believe that prestigious banks could,
under certain circumstances, have incentives to take higher risks; and a sudden
increase in competition would be the classic example (Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro,
). Flores (, ) suggests that this was the case in the s.7 In other
words, the leading bank had the incentive to decrease monitoring costs or to enter
into more aggressive competition or both. Negative externalities would emerge,
affecting financial markets in general and investors in particular.
The extent to which the conflict of interest affected London’s late nineteenth-
century financial market has never been systematically tested. However, banking his-
torians have already dealt with ‘reputation’ and the prominence of private banks such
as the ‘Sixth great power’ (for Baring, Ziegler ) or ‘The World’s banker’ (for
Rothschild, Ferguson ) and their impact on capital markets. This system seems
to have failed during the s, as the contemporary press suggests. The general
impression was that underwriters had adopted irresponsible management practices
and sought to deceive investors. To quote but a few examples, The Economist
break in prices would have been extremely prejudicial to the numerous financial operations which
they have on hand’ (a similar article was published on  October, emphasising this fact).
6 There were basically two loan-issuing systems: firm taking and placement. In the second system, banks
took no risk if they failed to place the bonds in the market. Today’s parallel would be the so-called ‘best
efforts’ system. Flores (, ) provides a detailed description of both issuing systems, and
Flandreau et al. (b) describe the long-term evolution of the underwriting of sovereign loans.
7 As Kindleberger () asserts, other agents observed Baring’s continuous involvement in Argentina,
and thus confidently invested or underwrote additional loans.
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commented on November : ‘HadMessrs Baring Brothers been able to shift the
burden of their South American obligations upon the investment they would now have
been standing erect… it must be admitted that they did not neglect to use all the means
in their power to rid themselves in this way of their liabilities.’ On the same day, The
Speaker came close to arguing that Baring had hidden information about Uruguay’s
level of floating debt (that country also defaulted), as otherwise the loan it had issued
on behalf of that country ‘would probably not have been a success’. Some days later,
The Economist severely concluded: ‘while the name of a well-known house must and
should always be of value, it has never been an index to the permanence of a country’s
solvency, and we should learn to accept it for what it is worth, and no more’.8
I I I
Ferns () differentiated information levels for investors and financial intermediaries,
and concluded that the former depended to a large extent on the latter. In his descrip-
tion of how information flowed, Ferns emphasises British investors’ low level of infor-
mation. According to him, investors neither knew nor had the means to know how the
money would be used. Any investor eager to increase revenues could make decisions
based on personal experience and invest in any asset that had already proved worth-
while. Financial intermediaries had a key role in recommending (or merely signalling
via underwriting activities) particular investment choices. The names of Baring
Brothers, Murrieta and other big banking houses meant much more to investors
than abstract countries. The banks’ decision to enter Argentina’s market served as a ‘cer-
tificate of confidence’ and thus as a substitute for knowledge, initiative and enterprise.
In the s, however, there were means available to obtain accurate information
about the economic situation of Argentina. Table  shows the main sources of econ-
omic and general information available to investors. In addition to private information
which individuals could obtain through particular activities such as trade or migration,
there were also the reports of the Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders
(CFB), the Mulhall Statistics, local representatives’ reports, the Statesman Yearbook,
Fenn on the Funds, official documents and the press. However, these publications
raised other questions. The CFB was mainly concerned with defaulting countries
and did not publish any information regarding the general macroeconomic position
of other borrowing countries. Rather, it collected ‘press clips’ and bought the official
publications that contained all information relevant to investors. Still, the most
detailed charter on debt figures about Argentina is published in the CFB report of
.9 The Statesman Yearbook often published budget figures only, and realised
8 The Economist,  May .
9 These problems are also acknowledged in Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (). About publications such
as the Investors’ Monthly manual, they argue that ‘often the data were not updated and thus referred to
previous years’ (p. ). With respect to the reports of the CFB, they recognise that they ‘were focused
… on countries with payment difficulties and their coverage was somewhat haphazard’ (p. ).
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data on debt, deficits or prices were not systematically provided. Even the main
sources, the Memorias from Argentina’s Ministry of Finance, were flawed due to a
number of accountability ambiguities (Duncan ), and their publication appeared
several months after a year’s end.
Table . Sources of information, other than official publications
Source Information disclosure What did it say?
Reports of the Council of
the Corporation of
Foreign Bondholders
Dispute on hard-dollars loan;
fiscal variables and state of
current account
Concerns about increase of
expenses and debt. In 
converted hard-dollars loan
were paid in paper pesos
Mulhall Statistics (in
Mulhall a and
Mulhall b)
Wealth estimates, debt level,
demographic and geographic
data on the country
: increase in debt higher
than increase in wealth
Local representatives
(General Council of the
Argentine Republic and
South American
Exchange and
Information Office)
General information for
merchants and potential
emigrants.
Use the press to
communicate Argentina’s
official messages
British representatives at
Buenos Aires
General, political and social
and economic information.
State of trade and
immigration
Focused on the gold
premium and increase in
public debt. Concerns
about the financial fragility
of the Government and
about the monetary policy
Statesman Yearbook Macroeconomic and fiscal
variables (total indebtedness,
trade balance, public deficit
and debt service
Argentina’s figures are mostly
those concerning the
budgets. A ratio of debt
service to public revenue
can nonetheless be
calculated, for an average
of % for –
Fenn on the Funds Trade test (ratio of net debt
per head to annual exports
per head). A value of the
ratio of more than 
(benchmark value) is
considered an early warning
signal.
Argentina’s value is .,
higher than well behaved
countries such as Belgium
(.) or Sweden (.) but
lower than other
problematic countries such
as Greece (.) or
Portugal (.)
Source: See text.
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Table  also summarises what we mentioned earlier: these sources were pessimistic
about the future of the country. Perhaps the most trusted source of information about
Argentina’s economic state at the time was Fenn on the Funds. It presented new calcu-
lations that took into account the wealth of the country – in a context where no GDP
figures were available – and the interest rates on its debts, and published an indicator of
debt sustainability. This indicator excluded the revenues earned from investments
financed with loans. This amount was capitalised at a rate of  per cent and divided
by the population (i.e. it was a per capita indicator). Fenn also measured the exports
per capita in order to obtain a wealth indicator, although the publication recognised
that this measure was far from a perfect ‘proxy’ for thewealth of a country.We looked
at the resulting indicators for several countries in . Argentina’s indicator is ..
This debt/exports ratio is higher than that of ‘well-behaved’ countries (Belgium, .;
Sweden, .; see Flandreau and Zumer ) but lower than that of the problematic
countries of that period (Greece, .; Portugal, .). Argentina’s ratio is also higher
than that of South American countries in a comparable situation, such as Brazil (.)
or Chile (.). Besides, Fenn’s compendium gave a threshold of  to classify countries
with possible indebtedness problems and Argentina was clearly on the wrong side of
that threshold.
The banks had different levels of information and for this reason one cannot gen-
eralise. However, one bank – Paribas – competed with Baring for loan business in
Argentina, and was representative of the new banks that entered the Argentine
market in the s. For the years  and , we found several reports in the
archives that aimed to inform the director of the bank about the economic situation
in Argentina and about the loans contracted by the country.10 The reports pointed
out the characteristics of the loans, the banks that issued them, the amount and the
price of the bonds already in the market, the purpose of the loans and the guarantees
for each of them. The bankmade use of commercial houses in Buenos Aires in order to
obtain information about the state of the market and to negotiate potential new loans
for the government. In the s, Bemberg was an intermediary between the
Argentine government and the bank.11 It sent telegrams (when a loan was negotiated)
or more detailed letters about the financial movements and the country’s state of affairs.
This bank possessed all the information necessary to decidewhether or not to make
a loan issue. It maintained a constant communication with other banks and with
Bemberg. The letters, however, were only concerned with each loan or advance,
and they frequently discussed market conditions for each new issue. At the same
time, Bemberg was in charge of informing the bank about the movements of any
potential competitor for new loans. When, after , Paribas was restricted to the
business of provincial loans, the only information the group obtained about
Argentina concerned the provinces with which the bank did business.
10 Paribas Archives, ., Box .
11 Formally, it was the representative of Paribas in Buenos Aires. Bemberg was a merchant house oper-
ating in Buenos Aires
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Thus, we suspect that the information these banks obtained was at best imperfect, or,
at worst, non-existent. For instance, in  a syndicate formed by the Bank de Paris et
des Pays Bas took firm a new loan fromCordoba province.12 The loan terms were rela-
tively favourable to the provincial government; they gave various guarantees, such as the
shares of the Provincial Bank of Cordoba, and the dividends of the Mortgage Bank of
the province, which were to be created with the funds from the loan, and the revenues
of the province. But, as the correspondence between the different banks that partici-
pated in the syndicate reveals, the banks were unsure of the reliability of the guarantees.
In a letter addressed to the governor of the province, dated  April , the banks
requested information about the revenues of the province, and the loan guarantee
amount. The province defaulted on its debts eight months later.
Baring’s level of information is best understood by examining the history of the
relationship between this bank and Argentina, which has been described by historians
such as Ferns (, ), Jones () and Ziegler (). These works describe in
similar terms the origins of the long-term relationship between Baring and Argentina
since the country got its first loan in . As Argentina defaulted on its debt in ,
Baring, unlike other banks involved in Argentine affairs, was the only one to defend
the interests of investors, succeeding eventually with an agreement in . This
necessary relationship with Argentina’s governments constituted its first source of
information. Baring pursued this agreement not for the benefit of Argentina or
even of the affected investors; it acted in its own interest to defend its reputation.
Ziegler argues that in order to remain trusted Baring had to guarantee the revenues
of investors. In fact, after , eight years passed before Baring decided to issue a
new loan on behalf of Argentina. Even this minor issue (£. million) was not a
success, and Baring had to buy £. million. Before the s, Baring only partici-
pated in two additional loans, although sharing Argentina’s market with two other
British banks (Morgan and Murrieta).
Apart from loans and short-term lending, Baring was also one of the main partici-
pants in the financing of Argentina’s trade, and operated through the commercial
houses established in Argentina. Zimmerman, Franzier and Co., from , and
then S. G. Hale & Co., from  and during the s, acted as intermediaries
between Argentina’s government and Baring. All these activities provided the bank
with information about Argentina’s state of affairs.13 During the boom of the s
and early s, Argentine bonds were in high demand in London and many of
them were issued by Murrieta and Stern. In this regard, Ziegler agrees with Ferns
about the particular position of Baring as a well-regarded provider of information,
both directly and through the involvement of the bank in new issues. In other
words, Baring possessed the information (which was expensive to acquire), but the
12 Paribas Archives, . .
13 It was one of these enterprises, the Buenos Aires Water Supply Company, whose stock was under-
written by Baring (and failed to place), which led to Baring’s fall in , although the first issues
took place in the late .
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benefits had to be shared with newcomers. This situation was to explode during the
s.
An additional factor to be taken into account is the quality of information from the
most important source, Baring’s representatives in Argentina. In an apparently contra-
dictory manner, this channel was important and efficient during the s, but then
worsened in the s, precisely at a time when it was the most necessary. A detailed
examination of the Baring Archives reveals that most information Baring possessed
about Argentina in the s and s came from correspondence with Nicholas
Bower, one of its employees sent to Argentina after the  crisis, and from some
messages telegraphed when important events took place. Bower’s reports covered
several aspects of the country: trade, prices, immigration, financial position, banks,
natural resources, tradable assets and so forth. Bower also established an almost per-
sonal relationship with Argentina’s government. We have found written reports con-
taining the exact same statistics as those published three months later in theMemorias,
with additional comments expressing Bower’s own point of view and derived from
conversations with Argentine politicians. Between  and  Bower provided
Baring with a constant flow of information about the economic situation of the
state of their investments, and opportunities for new business. Financial markets
were aware that Baring had information, because the latter provided news through
the press whenever an extraordinary event occurred or in times of uncertainty.
However, this situation changed in  for several reasons. On the one hand,
there was increased competition (Jones ; Marichal ; Flores , ).
When new banks started issuing loans on the financial markets of Europe, the
relationship between Baring and Argentina deteriorated. Jones wrote that ‘Bower
was at great pains to point out to the National Finance Minister the serious loss
which the government had sustained through dealing with the French.’14 In fact,
Ferns argues that Baring was willing to formalise its relationship with Argentina
and thereby block the entry of any new competitor. In , Baring insisted on an
‘open line of credit secured by saleable assets’ and demanded that the government
agree to only deal with Baring for any new loan issue. Both requests were declined
by Argentina. On the other hand, the relationship between Bower and Baring also
deteriorated after . Baring decided to close its agency in Buenos Aires and con-
tinued to operate only through Hale & Co. Bower continued to work with Baring
but in a rather different way. From , his reports became much less detailed and
frequent than those he had provided between  and .15 Still, Baring made
a final attempt at the end of , sending John Baring to report and evaluate
Argentina’s economic situation and in particular the projects in which the bank
had direct interest (Ziegler ). However, John proved to be a poor risk analyst.
14 Jones (, p. ).
15 However, in Baring’s accounting books, I have found that the annual wage of Nicholas Bower con-
tinued to be the same during those years (£, until ), but was reduced in  to £ (ING
Baring Archives, Ledgers –, Ref. ).
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In fact, he wrongly concluded: ‘Of a crash, I think there is no chance whatever…Of
their defaulting on their bonds I do not believe there to be the least chance.’16
As the Baring crisis approached, telegrams between Baring and Samuel Hale
became more frequent while they were negotiating a loan with the government to
avoid default.17 The main questions discussed were the conditions Baring wanted
the government to meet (i.e. that the government pledge customs revenue and
that payment be made half in gold). Both conditions were initially refused in
Buenos Aires, but by mid , at Baring’s insistence, the government ended up
accepting.
A final question concerns the fact that Baring went bankrupt in  despite its
information lead. Though there is no easy answer, looking at the stock portfolios
of three banks – Paribas, Rothschild and Baring – enables us to see to what extent
each bank was exposed to the ‘Argentine risk’ in the late s.18 Table  shows
that Baring held . per cent of its portfolio in Argentine securities in  (excluding
its participation in syndicates, which would increase the total to . per cent in 
as estimated by The Economist).19 Neither of the other banks had such an amount,
although Paribas’s participation in syndicates amounted to . per cent in the
same year. Rothschild, for instance, only held a small percentage of Argentina’s secu-
rities. However, as the main underwriter of Brazilian securities, it held large amounts
of these securities in its portfolio – about . per cent in . After the crisis in ,
Baring, again, held a comparable amount of Argentine securities (. per cent).
Though we cannot conclude that banks followed an unwritten ‘relationship
banking rule’, whereby they held  per cent of their underwritten securities in
their portfolio, we may safely assert that the banks that were the most affected by
defaults were the ones that had close relationships with the defaulting countries.
We therefore believe that in these cases there was little scope for a conflict of interest.
IV
In a first set of tests we examine the effects of the reputation of different banks on the
risk perception of investors in securities issued by these banks. Some works argue that
investors take into account the fact that the less reputable banks have the most severe
conflict of interest problem and the bonds they issue are therefore perceived as riskier.
The more reputable banks have more to lose, and therefore the problem of conflict of
interest is less severe. This first set of tests has two objectives. The first is to determine
whether there is a difference between the ex-ante perceived risk associated with the
bonds issued by the most reputable banks and that associated with the bonds issued by
16 Quoted in Ziegler (, p. )
17 See ING Baring Archives, HC....
18 The sources are: Paribas: Rapport des commissaires et Bilans Généraux. Baring: Yearly Balance
Sheets. Rothschild: Ledger Balances.
19 The Economist,  June .
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the other banks. The second objective is to establish whether these reputable banks
acted as certifiers, which would reduce the cost of issuance of the bonds issued by
these banks.
In Table  we present the league tables of sovereign debt underwriters and the
spreads at issue per bank in the two periods, – and – (for comparison
purposes, we have included the boom and bust period that preceded our period of
analysis). We observe that, as contemporary records suggest, Rothschild and Baring
acted as market leaders, both banks represented about half of the market in both
periods. The unweighted average of the spreads at issue for Rothschild’s loans is
the lowest in the first period, and one of the lowest in the second. Baring follows
as the second underwriter in both periods.20 During the mid-century period,
Baring’s bond issue spreads were lower than other issues but high in comparison to
the issues made in the second period. During the – period, the spreads of
issues from Baring were lower but the difference from the rest of the market is not
very clear. Moreover, some banks were issuing loans that were perceived as less
risky. In fact, it would be safe to assert that whereas during the mid-century period
Baring differed from the other underwriters, this was no longer the case by the
time the  crisis occurred. We discuss this hypothesis in more detail below.
A final remark on Table  concerns an ex-post measure, namely, the amount of
defaulting bonds underwritten by each bank. Recall that in the absence of conflict
of interest, reputable banks should also have better ex-post performances than the
rest. Otherwise, we would be able to assert that underwriters fooled investors by
bringing securities that were perceived as ‘safe’ but that performed badly. During
the first period, Rothschild and Baring had a market share of  per cent of the total
amount of bonds that later defaulted. The third bank, Imperial Ottoman Bank, con-
centrated about  per cent. This bad performance may explain why its market share
dropped sharply during the second period. But the striking results concern the top
Table . Portfolio of different banks, – at end of year (figures include stocks and foreign bonds,
market value from banks accounting books)
Rothschild Paribas Baring
 . . NA
 . . .
 . . .
Sources: Rothschild: Stock Ledgers Bookkeepers Department, -. Baring: Baring ING
Baring archives Ref. . Balances, ,  . For : estimates from The Economist,
 June . Paribas: Archives Paribas, Portefeuille Siège Social.
20 The main results do not significantly change conducting weighted averages.
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Table . League tables and spreads at issue of top  underwriters, – and –
Period I: Mid nineteenth century Period II: Baring crisis
Bank Market shares
(in %) of
amount
underwritten
Unweighted
mean of spread
at issue
Market share
(in %) of
amount
underwritten in
default
Bank Market share
in % of
amount
underwritten
Unweighted
mean of spread
at issue
Market share
(in %) of
amount
underwritten in
default
Rothschild . . . Rothschild . . .
Baring . . . Baring . . .
Imperial
Ottoman Bank
. . . Hambro . . .
Spanish Financial
Commission
. .  Comptoir
National
d’Escompte
. . 
Bischoffsheim &
Goldschmidt
. . . Glyn Mills . . 
Stern . .  Russian Bank
for Foreign
Trade
. . 
I. Thomson,
T. Bonar
. . . Imperial
Ottoman
Bank
. . 
Schröder . . . Antony Gibbs . . 
Hope . .  Stern Bros . . .
J. S. Morgan . .  J. S. Morgan . . .
Other banks . . . Other banks . . .
Sources: See text.
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banks’ performance in the second period. The ‘top three’ underwrote about  per
cent of the bonds that were to default. The above mentioned criticisms made by
the press were therefore not unjustified. Nevertheless, it would be premature to
draw conclusions from this result. Those of Rothschild’s issues that defaulted were
mostly those of Brazil in , that is to say  years after the initial issue.
Rothschild itself organised a bailout that provided a high profit for holders of
Brazilian bonds, as demonstrated by Flandreau and Flores (). Baring’s
Argentinian issues caused liquidity problems for the bank itself and it would therefore
be irrational to assume that the bank consciously issued bad loans by selling them as
good ones; but this will be discussed in the last section. Finally, defaults of the bonds
issues fromHambro only concerned the Greek bonds, as otherwise this bank concen-
trated on the safe albeit small market of Scandinavian bonds. As we will see, Greek
spreads at issue were also higher than the average spreads of Hambro’s issues.
In order to formally test for differences between means of the spreads at issue,
Table  compares the spreads at issue of Rothschild and Baring with spreads of
bonds issued by other banks. The tests are the two-tailed t-test and the non-para-
metric Wilcoxon test.21 Our null hypothesis states that there are no differences
between Rothschild and Baring’s spreads at issue and that of other banks. The
upper part of the table shows the results for the first period. Rothschild issues are
on average  basis points lower than issues from the rest of the market (excluding
Baring). The difference is significant at  per cent for both tests. The difference
between Baring and the rest of the market, which is  basis points, is also significant.
Interestingly, these differences almost disappear in the second period. Between
Rothschild and the rest of the market there is a difference of  basis points, and
between Baring and the rest there is a  basis point difference. These differences
Table . Univariate tests for differences in spreads at issue between the top two banks and the rest of the
market
Period Mean Sample size t-test Wilcoxon test p-value
Mid century
Rothschild .  –.*** .***
Baring .  –.*** .**
Others .  – –
Baring crisis
Rothschild .  –. .*
Baring .  –. .
Others .  – –
Sources: See text.
Note: *denotes significance at . levels, **at . levels and ***at . levels.
21 This kind of analysis is also conducted by Puri () for the pre-Glass Steagall Act period.
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appear to be insignificant, although the Wilcoxon test shows a  per cent significance
for Rothschild. In other words, investors did not expect Rothschild and Baring issues
to be less risky.
We have complemented this analysis by examining other variables affecting
spreads: economic fundamentals and bonds’ particular characteristics (see the
Appendix for a description of data sources). They include macroeconomic, fiscal
and monetary variables, as well as variables measuring borrowers’ reputation (if the
borrower had a previous default), as in previous studies such as those conducted by
Bordo and Rockoff (), Obstfeld and Taylor (), Flandreau and Zumer
(), and more recently by Cameron, Gai and Yong Tan (). Our analysis
differs from previous works in that it looks at the primary market of bonds, and
thus our dependent variable is spreads at issue. This allows us to take into account
the second group of independent variables, such as the identity of the underwriter,
the syndicate’s size, whether or not it is a new issue, whether or not the bond is
secured, and the number of years since the first issue by the borrower.
We estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression:
Spread ¼ b0 þ b1FiscVar þ b2MonVar þ b3MacroVar þ b4RepVar þ b5IssueVar
þ b6BankVar
where fiscal variables (FiscVar) include the debt service to fiscal revenues ratio, the
debt to GDP ratio, the public deficit to fiscal revenue ratio and the public deficit to
GDP ratio. Monetary variables (MonVar) include a dummy variable that takes
value  if the country has the gold standard and  otherwise; we also look for exchange
rate volatility measured by the ratio between the standard deviation of the monthly
nominal exchange rates to the sterling pound and its annual mean. The macro-
economic variables (MacroVar) include the inflation rate, exports to GDP ratio and
a country’s terms of trade measured by the deviation of log terms of trade from the
panel mean. Reputation variables (RepVar) include an ‘age’ variable defined by the
number of years since the first issue in London. It tests Tomz’s () hypothesis
that the seasoned borrowers have more favourable market access. The second variable
is a dummy which takes value  if the issuer defaulted at least once and  for a clean
defaulting record. Issue variables (IssueVar) include the characteristics of the new
bonds: nominal amount, maturity, number of banks in the underwriting syndicate
(syndicate size), the existence of a guarantee (through a dummy variable,  if the
loan if secured,  otherwise).22 Finally, the identity of the underwriter is captured
in the bank variable (BankVar), with two dummy variables, one for Baring and the
other for Rothschild.
Table  summarises themain results. The estimates show that the group of economic
variables (fiscal, monetary and macroeconomic) are significant and with the expected
22 Maturity data exist for most issues. However, most Rothschild loans had no pre-specified maturity
date.
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sign, with the significant exception of the terms of trade. Countries on the gold stan-
dard seem to enjoy lower spreads (the exchange rate volatility shows similar results but
they are less significant and have been left out of the regressions in the table). The
indebtedness level had a positive effect on spreads; furthermore, the governments of
the more open economies also seem to have had more favourable access to capital
markets.23 The IssueVar group has mixed results, although the defaulter dummy was
always significant and with the correct sign. The age variable also had the expected
sign for some regressions, but not for all of them. The maturity and amount variables
were not significant. Finally, the syndicate size variable was frequently significant.
The dummy variables for the identity of the underwriter also showed mixed evi-
dence.Most regressions showed that the Rothschild variable did have a negative effect
on spreads, though this was not consistent. Baring does not appear to have any signifi-
cant impact on spreads. In fact, the inclusion of macroeconomic variables, as well as
the default and age variables, minimises the importance of the bankers’ effect,
although our sample size also decreased (due to data constraints) and the results are
therefore less representative. Nonetheless, it is clear that there is a difference
between Rothschild and Baring. The former seems to have a negative effect on
spreads, albeit to a small degree. This is also consistent with the univariate tests,
which show that spreads of Rothschild issues where lower, but the difference was
not what it had been in the past. For our purposes, we may conclude that Baring
had no ‘reputation’ or ‘certification’ effect. The bank was selling risky securities,
just as the other banks did. Investors fixed prices according to the risk.
Underwriting fees: the case of the  agreement
One way to know whether conflicts of interest existed in the late s is to look at
credit risk perception of financial intermediaries and investors. In normal, crisis-free
times, spreads or securities risk premia should behave in a manner similar to under-
writer fees. In times of ‘near crisis’, in a context of information asymmetries, this cor-
relation breaks down and fees can react more rapidly than spreads.24 The reason for
this can be found in the vast literature on the factors determining underwriting
fees.25 They can be classified into three groups: bonds’ characteristics, underwriting’s
market structure (whereby competition reduces fees, see Gandes et al. ) and credit
quality. Previous studies have shown that the market for risky bonds is smaller and less
liquid than the market for risk-free bonds, which makes their placement more diffi-
cult. In the event of default, the financial intermediary’s reputation would suffer.
Moreover, the higher the risk of a new issue, the more difficult it becomes to estimate
the issue price; compensation is naturally required for the additional effort
(Livingston, Pratt and Mann ; Melnik and Nissim ). Thus, underwriting
23 The debt service to fiscal revenue ratio also has the expected sign and resulted significant in most of the
regressions, but due to space constraints results are not shown. They are available upon request.
24 Empirical evidence of this for the s sovereign debt crises can be found in Nieto-Parra ().
25 Pioneering studies were performed by Cohan (), West () and Mendelson ().
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Table . Multivariate tests: OLS Regressions. Dependent variable: spreads at issue
Variable Regression  Regression  Regression  Regression  Regression  Regression 
Constant .*** (.) .*** (.) .*** (.) .*** (.) .*** (.) .*** (.)
Maturity (in
years)
–. (–.)
Amount (in
, of £)
–.E- (–.)
Syndicate size –.** (–.) –.** (–.)
Defaulter .*** (.) .*** (.) .*** (.)
Age –.** (–.) –.*** (–.) –. (–.) . (.) . (.)
Secured .*** (.)
Rothschild –.** (–.) –. (–.) . (.) –.** (–.)
Baring . (.) –. (–.) . (.) .** (.)
Deficit to
revenue
–.* (–.)
Gold Dummy –.*** (–.) –.*** (–.) –.** (–.) –. (–.) –. (–.)
Reserves to M –.*** (–.)
Terms of trade .** (.) .** (.) .** (.)
Debt to GDP .*** (.) .** (.)
Exports to GDP –.*** (–.) –.*** (–.)
R- . . . . . .
Number of
observations
     
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Sources: See text.
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fees and secondary market prices depend on the same variables: an economic shock
may cause the prices of that country’s bonds to fall. When a government presents a
higher risk of default, the underwriters charge them higher fees on new issues
ceteris paribus. Flandreau et al. (a) show evidence about the long-term relationship
between fees and spreads at issue in sovereign debt markets for the last  years and
find a constant, negative relation between both variables.
A final question concerns the mechanisms through which new information could
have an immediate impact on spreads and fees. If information is public, then both vari-
ables should behave in the same way (though the elasticities of each variable to new
events may differ). Now consider, for instance, the scenario in which a bank, willing
to issue a new loan on behalf of the government of Argentina, suddenly receives a
telegram from its agent in Buenos Aires about a new estimate of a higher deficit
than previously expected. This is not a hypothetical case: as we mentioned above,
figures about fiscal variables could take as long as three months to be published in
the official Memorias or in the press. This negative shock may make the success of a
new issue more uncertain, and the bank may therefore automatically adapt its under-
writing fee to compensate for the increased risk, but would be unwilling to lower the
issue price which would send a negative signal to the markets, thereby affecting sec-
ondary market prices and increasing the probability of failure of the new issue. This
fact would be, per se, evidence of conflict of interest. In other words, selling risky
securities is no evidence of ‘bad behaviour’ as long as there is a market for them.
But selling risky securities as if they were good is a different story, and this explains
why regulatory authorities have been interested in underwriting fees in later
periods, when banks were suspected of inappropriate behaviour.26 We have gathered
data on fees – for the – period – from debt contracts, archives and secondary
literature. Sources are described in the Appendix. Figure  shows the positive relation-
ship between spreads at issue and underwriting fees during the s.27 At first glance,
Argentina does not seem to be an outlier.28 But now, let us consider the case for
the  planned bailout. Two additional loans were negotiated – though eventually
not issued – between Argentina, Uruguay and Baring as early as March . The
resulting debt underwriting fees were . for Uruguay and . for Argentina.29
Both observations are outliers, and do not correspond to the normal relation
between fees and spreads; for both observations, the fees were affected more
rapidly by Argentina’s bad economic situation. In other words, at the only time
when Baring could have taken advantage of its information lead, the bank was
26 For a discussion of this argument for the s see Flandreau, Gaillard and Panizza ().
27 I have also run a regression to determine the relationship between underwriting fees and spreads.
Results are the following (t-stats in parentheses): fee = . (.) + . (.***)*spread; R= ..
28 The main outlier of the regression is the % underwriting fee of China’s % loan of .
29 The Bank of Uruguay was the first to suffer a crisis which triggered a banking panic that expanded to
banks in Argentina ( July , The Economist). Baring negotiated a loan parallel to that negotiated
with Argentina’s government. The price at issue was not agreed in the contracts, though I have esti-
mated it as a simple average of Argentina’s similar bonds on the secondary market.
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overwhelmed by a wave of negative shocks (and publicly known) that lead to
Argentina’s accelerated collapse.
V
An examination of the correspondence between Baring and its agents in Buenos Aires
shows no evidence that Baring sought to hide information from investors. Instead, the
correspondence suggests that Baring was confident that default could be avoided with
the planned bailout. The conditions of the  contract forced the country to
modify its economic policy. Baring imposed three conditions: no further issues of
paper money, until the gold premium reached a level of . The second was the pro-
hibition of further borrowing from external sources for two years. Finally, half of the
customs revenues had to be collected in gold pesos, reinforcing the government’s
capacity to service its debt.
From the analysis of the sources of information available to investors we also know
that they could have known of the problems facing Argentina even though they had
less information than banks. The tendency of financial intermediaries, however, was
to send confidence signals by issuing new bonds as demand existed. This behaviour
was motivated by a desire for short-term gains. Baring, in contrast, relied on a
long-term relationship and had different incentives from those of competing banks.
The information model that prevailed at the time began to change in the early
s. Capital exports came to a ‘sudden stop’ during the s, and the information
structure began to change. The reports of the CFB began to be more detailed, other
banks followed Credit Lyonnais’s unit of analysis, and the financial press experienced a
new boom. Argentina was excluded from capital markets for some years and Baring
Figure . Underwriting fees and spreads at issue
Sources: See text and Appendix.
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subsequently returned to business as the only merchant bank for the issues of the
country’s government, recovering its quasi-monopolistic position. Argentina did
not experience additional crises before World War I. Nonetheless, even in this
new context of increased information availability (and thus higher ‘transparency’),
there continued to be financial crises throughout the world.
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Appendix . Data sources
Primary market variables
() Bond data: the multivariate analysis of the ex ante tests of conflict of interest
includes all the public offerings of foreign government sovereign debt on London
excluding pure conversions (for which there was no price at issue). The complete
list is taken from Suzuki (). That list includes data on nominal amounts and under-
writers’ identity. It has been revised with data from the Investors’ Monthly Manual
(IMM), The Times (London), Burdett’s Stock Market Official Intelligence and debt con-
tracts, from which we had data for prices at issue, maturity, underwiters’ syndicate
size and bonds’ guarantees. A complete list since the beginning of the nineteenth
century has been constructed with data from Clarke (), CFB () and the
London Times with which we construct the variable age (number of years since first
issue in London) and the dummy variable ‘New Borrower’, equal to one if the bor-
rower issues for the first time a loan in London,  otherwise. The countries included
in the list are the following: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Cuba, Denmark,
Egypt, Greece, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Persia,
Portugal, Russia, Salvador, Santo Domingo, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, USA.
() Spreads at issue: defined as the difference between the yield on long-term gold
or sterling government bonds measured by the coupon-price ratio and the yield of
UK consols (from Klovland ).
() Fees: China: HSBC Archives, Greece: Dritsas (), Japan: Suzuki (). Data
on Norway’s loans are from Klovland () but we have excluded the first loan as
data are not consistent with the issue price; data on Argentine, Brazilian and
Chilean fees are from Flores (). Russia’s fees are from Girault () and from
archives (Rothschild, Paribas and ING Baring). These archives were also used to
obtain other fees for Italy, Portugal and Uruguay.
Macroeconomic variables
() Gold dummy variable: Flandreau and Zumer () for the period - for
the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,Denmark,Greece,Holland,Hungary,
Italy,Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain and Sweden.Otherwise:Meissner () and for
countries that issued during -, Obstfeld and Taylor ().
() Volatility of exchange rate: Flandreau and Zumer () for the same countries
and period than above.We have computed volatilities for exchange rates from the fol-
lowing sources: Chile from Flores (), otherwise Schneider et al. ().
() Inflation: Flandreau and Zumer () and Obstfeld and Taylor () as in ().
Chile: Braun et al. (). Turkey: Schuler (). Uruguay: Bértola ().
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() Reserves andM: Flandreau and Zumer () for countries and period as in ().
Chile: Braun et al. ().
() Deficits, revenues and public debt: Flandreau and Zumer () and Obstfeld
and Taylor () as in (). Chile: Braun et al. (). Mexico: Carmagnani ().
Uruguay: Bertino and Bertoni ().
() Debt service: Flandreau and Zumer (). Chile: Braun et al. (). Mexico:
Carmagnani ().
() Nominal GDP:Uruguay: Bértola (). Chile: Braun et al. (). Otherwise
Flandreau and Zumer () and Obstfeld and Taylor () as in ().
() Terms of trade: defined as inObstfeld and Taylor (). The variable measures
the deviation of log terms of trade from the panel mean. Source for the data is
Blattman, Hwang and Williamson ().
() Exports: same as ().
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